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Abstract
The interaction of consumer devices and the internet, especially in relation to security, has always
beentenuous.Whereitisinthebestinterestsofcompaniestoproduceproductsthatarecheapand
accessible,thesetraitsoftengoagainstthatofsecurity.Thisinvestigationundertakesananalysisof
one such device – the DCS930L internet protocol camera from DLink. This camera is analysed for
vulnerabilities, with an emphasis on those relating to authentication mechanisms. Several
vulnerabilities are identified, and potential attacks based on these are discussed. Solutions or
mitigationstothesevulnerabilitiesarepresented.
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INTRODUCTION
Internetprotocolcamerasaresmallelectronicdevices,presentinhome,commercialand business
variants.Theytypicallyconsistofavideocameraattachedtoasmallwebserver,allowingaccessto
thedeviceviainternetprotocols.Thisaccesscanbeusedtoviewthecamerasvision,aswellasto
update and adjust its settings. Unfortunately, there have been recent suggestions that IP cameras
contain less than ideal security (Heffner, 2013a; Sood & Gajbhiye, 2011). Given their purpose as
security devices, this can be understandably upsetting for consumers as their privacy maybe
impacted.
This research studied  one such device: the DCS930L from DLink (DLink Australia, 2013). This
camera was selected due to its features, availability and low cost. It is considered to be
representative of the consumergrade IP camera market in general. This brand of camera also
possess a history of dangerous vulnerabilities, including authentication bypasses and command
injection(Paleari,2013;Rocha,M.,etal.,2013).
In terms of features, the camera contains the ability to wirelessly access a network, as well as
operateasitsownaccesspoint.Additionally,itcancollaboratewithonlinesoftwarecontrolledbyD
Link, to give access to the device from remote locations. The device can also be programmed to
allow remote access over the internet. As of November 2013, there are over 40,000 DCS930L
camerasdirectlyaccessiblebyinternetusers(Shodan,2013).
Theinvestigationwasbrokenintoseveralphases.Firstly,informationregardinghowtheIPcamera
operates,includingthecontentsofitsembeddedsystem,willberesearched.Thisprocesswillfocus
on the authentication mechanisms in particular. From here, possible attacks against these
authentication processes will be analysed.  Following this, postauthenticated attacks will be
investigated.Thatis,attacksthatrequireanauthenticatedusertoperform.

METHODOLOGY
A means to monitor and manipulate communication between the IP camera and the interacting
computerwasrequired.Wiresharkwasusedtomonitorthenetworkstream,duringbothEthernet
and wireless communications (Wireshark Foundation, 2013). Burpsuite was employed to capture
trafficmovingtowardthecamera,andmanipulateitasnecessary(PortSwigger,2013).
The contents of the current firmware embedded in the camera was considered vital pieces of
information. As such, they were unpacked using a program called binwalk (Heffner, 2013b). This
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providedinformationregardingtheresourcesheldonthedevice,includingthoseemployedbythe
webserver.Additionally,certainopensourcesoftwareusedinthedeviceemploycertainlicencesfor
exampleforvideocompression.Theselicencesstatethatacopyofthesourcecodemustbemade
available to interested parties if the programs are used in commercial systems. A copy of this
informationwasobtained,butfoundtobeoutdated.
Webbasedforms,andothermethodsthroughwhichtocommunicatewiththedevice,werechecked
for sanitisation. Put another way, the web server was tested to see if it properly escapes and
sanitisestheinformationitreceives.Ifthisisnotthecase,thecameramaybeopentomanipulation.
HTML and hex encoding schemes were used, as well as special characters (such as null and
terminatingbytes).
AuthenticationandPreAuthenticationAttacks
The DCS930L camera in question appears to utilise two different authentication schemes: basic
access and digest access (NWG, 1999). Basic access authentication consists of encoding the
password and username using the base 64 encoding scheme. This result is then bundled with an
authorisationheader,andattachedtoanyrequestsforresources.Awebserverwillthenreversethe
encodingandcheckthecredentialsagainstitsownlist.
Digestaccessisslightlymorecomplex,inthiscaseinvolvingmd5hashing.Severaldifferentpiecesof
informationarecombinedandhashedinaspecifiedmanner.Thisinformationincludesapassword
andusername,aswellasarealm,urirequestandcreatednonce.Theoutcomeofthisprocess,along
withthespecifiednonce,issentinresponsetoanauthorisationrequest.Ifthesamehashvalueis
achieved by the server, it is assumed that the same username and password was used in each
calculation(andthusthattheclientisauthorised).
Each of these authentication schemes carries with it some weaknesses. Firstly, the basic
authentication scheme contains no real protection in terms of confidentiality. Any member of the
networkthathasaccesstothetrafficstreamwillbeabletoreversethebase64encoding.Thiswill
revealtheplaintextvaluesfortheusernameandpassword.Base64characterencodingwasdesigned
asameanstotransferinformation,ratherthanprotectit.
Thedigestauthenticationmethodisconsiderablysaferintermsofconfidentiality,however,stillhas
some issues. Firstly, the current implementation in the camera appears to allow replay attacks. A
userwhohasmanagedtocapturealegitimateauthorisationrequest,cansimplyresendthatrequest
themselves,to'authenticate',andgainaccesstoaresource.
That said, this result is somewhat limited given the design of digest authentication. One of the
parametersofthisaccessschemeisthattheURLbeingrequestedbyapartyisitselfhashedwithin
the request. This means that any replay attacks will only be effective against a single resource or
request. In relation to the camera, there are instances where the resource being requested is the
videofeed,andthusareplayattackagainstthisresourcewillbeparticularlyeffective.Itistheorised
thatanattackercancontinuallyreplaytheauthenticatedrequestforconstantaccesstothisfeed.
Alternatively (or additionally), an eavesdropping attacker may wish to conduct an offline attack
againstalegitimatedigestauthorisationrequest.Asitstands,fourofthefivepiecesofinformation
required for digest authentication are known to an eavesdropping attacker (ie the username is
lockedas‘admin’,therealm,theurirequestedandthenonce).Fromhere,itwouldbefairlysimple
tocreateabruteforcescripttoiteratethroughpossiblevaluesforthepassword,andcheckthese
againsttheexpectedhash.
ThepossibilityofanonlinebruteforceattackisalsoavailableagainsttheDCS930L.Astheusername
forthesystemisdefaultedto'admin',onlythepasswordisunknowntoanattacker.Fromhere,an
attackerisabletogenerateapossiblepassword,encodeitdependingontheschemerequired(ie.
basic or digest access) and send a request to the cameras server. There does not appear to be a
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mechanism to prevent this kind of attack built into the camera, such as a lockout period after a
certainnumberoffailedattempts.Additionally,theredoesnotappeartobeanyloggingorreporting
forthiskindofbehaviour.
This threat of a brute force attack is significantly increased when considering an additional bug
within the older firmware versions. Specifically, until the most recent patch (Firmware v1.08b04),
passwords for the DSC930L were limited to only eight characters (DLink, 2013). This significantly
decreases the number of combinations for a password, and thus increases the efficacy of brute
forcingthedevice.
AnotherattackagainsttheDCS930LauthenticationmaybepossiblethroughUDPbroadcasts.The
camera in question comes with a wizard to help during setup and installation. Analysis of the
communicationbetweenthecameraandthiswizardappearstoshowthataUDPbroadcastissent
bythewizard,whichtheclientcamerarespondsto(alsointheformofaUDPbroadcast).Asthese
arebroadcastpackets(asopposedtodirect)anymemberofthesubnetmaypickthemup.
Thereisevidencetosuggestthatthesetransmissionscontainthepasswordforthecamera(Doyle,
2012),albeitinwhatappearstobeacustomencryptionscheme.
Thisencryptionschememaybesusceptibletoalimitedrange,knownplaintextattack.Specifically,
the camera name appears to be one of the pieces of information sent during this exchange. An
attacker may choose to manipulate this variable, and monitor the differences it makes on the
encrypted traffic. In addition, it appears that this encrypted communication occurs without the
passing of any variables (such as session keys). In turn, this would suggest that the algorithm for
encryptionishardcodedintoaprogram,storedbothonthedeviceandthewizardapplication.Ifan
attacker were to reverse engineer this software, they may have alternate means for determining
how the encryption scheme works. From here, they may be able to manipulate the requests for
informationtothedevice,andthuscompromiseitssecurity.
Reverseengineeringofthefirmwarealsorevealsapieceofinformationintriguingtoanattacker:a
public and private key pair. Although the server appears to support SSL traffic, this was only seen
during communication with the official DLink website (when attempting to access the device
remotely through their interface). Applying the private key with Wireshark, some of the
communicationbetweenthecameraandthewebsitewasrevealed.Thiscommunicationappeared
to access resources that were already publically accessible (see the next paragraph for more
informationonthis).Nofurtherinformationwasrevealedwithinthiscommunicationstream,butit
doessuggestthatthecameracanbedirectlycommunicatedwithbyDLink.
In addition to the weaknesses of the authentication mechanisms, there appear to be several
resources that are accessible without authentication. Specifically, these are located at
/cgi/common.cgi,cgi/strminfo.cgiandafolderat/apithatappearstoholdaJavaprogram.Overall,
thesefilesdon'tprovidevastamountsofinformationtoanattacker.Thecommon.cgifileisperhaps
themostinteresting,asitcontainsthecurrentinternalIPaddressofthecamera,aswellasitsmac
address,currentname,versioninformationandgatewayaddress(allimportantinformationforan
attackerwishingtoconductaMITMstyleattack).
Independently, these vulnerabilities wouldn't be considered particularly devastating. That said,
combiningseveraltogetherdoescreatequiteaconcerningattack.Asanexample,amalicioususer
maydeterminethecurrentfirmwareversionofaparticularcamerausingunauthenticatedaccessto
thecommon.cgifile.Fromhere,theymaychoosetoinitiateabruteforceattackagainstacamera
operatingwithnoncurrentfirmware(iev1.07b5andprior).Knowingthepasswordisamaximumof
eightcharacters,thiswouldarguablybequiteeffective.Combiningthisprocesswithascanningtool,
itwouldbepossibletoautomatethisentireprocess.
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The wireless schemes employed by the device are also somewhat vulnerable. The camera itself
contains wireless capability in two forms: infrastructure and ad hoc. Infrastructure mode uses an
availableroutertoconnecttoanetwork,allowingausertoaccessthecamerathroughtherouter.
Alternatively, the device can also be placed in ad hoc mode, in which it creates its own wireless
network.Ausercanthenconnectdirectlytothedevice.Unfortunately,thisadhocmodeappearsto
only support WEP encryption (as opposed to WPA or WPA2). There have been several, well
documentedattacksagainstthesecurityofWEPencryptionwithintheliterature(Stubblefield,etal.,
2001;CamWinget,etal.,2003).
PostAuthenticationAttacks
Several different attacks and attack avenues are open to a user with authenticated access. Direct
access to sensitive information is one such example. The webbased interface that a user would
typicallyinteractwithappearstosourceinformationfrom'hidden'cgifiles.Thesefilesappeartobe
directly accessible by url, assuming the url is known by the interested party, and that party is
authenticated.Reverseengineering thefirmware, aswellasinvestigatingthestringsstoredwithin
the main web server executable, reveal the location of these resources. They typically store
information such as FTP details, the username and password of any attached email accounts,
network details, a plaintext version of the current admin password and the wireless password to
accessthedevice(ifapplicable).
Theserveralsoappearstocreateacustomerrormessageifaresourceisnotfound(ie.Itwillstate
totheuserthataparticularresourcedoesnotexist).Althoughthisdoesrequireauthentication,it
canbeusedtoenumeratetheresourcesontheserverasawhole.Forexample,creatingascriptto
iteratethroughpossibleresourcenamescouldbeusedtouncoverfurther'hidden'resources.
The server appears to employ clientside argument validation via JavaScript on several forms. By
interactingwitharequestoutsideofthebrowser(eg.Throughburpsuite)itispossibletobypassthis
validation.Whilsttheserverdoesseemtoperformsomeadditionalvalidationitself,certainrequests
canstillproduceunwantedbehaviourintheIP camera.Forexample,sendingarequest tochange
thenameofthecameratonovalue(ie.Nullorempty)resultsinthedevicebecominginaccessible.
This will occur until a hard reset is performed, which will return the camera name to a nonnull
value.
Likewise,itispossibletoaddausertothesystemwithnoname,throughasimilarprocess.Thisis
actuallysomewhatmoredangerousintermsofsecurity.Forstarters,thisusernameishardtodetect
in the user list, given that it is simply a blank line. Additionally, it is not possible to delete this
username from the list of users. This may not seem too unfortunate, although it does open the
camerauptoapersistentthreat.Ifanattackerweretosetthepasswordoftheblankusertonull(or
empty), certain parts of the camera will then be accessible without authentication (or more
correctly,byauthenticatingwithausernameofnullandpasswordofnull).Admittedly,ifanattacker
has the ability to add users to a system, they are already in a powerful position. The inability to
removetheuser,however,aswellasthecamouflageitemploys,increasesthisthreatsomewhat.
The sanitisation of information from all sources appears to be quite thorough by the web server.
Therewerenoopportunitiesdiscoveredthatallowedcrosssitescripting(eitherreflectedorstored).
There was also no apparently ability to perform url path traversal, using encoded or nonencoded
combinations.Althoughsomefunctionalitywasdistorted(eg.Thecameranamechange),thiseffect
waslimitedinscopeandimpact.

CONCLUSION
Overall, the IP camera in question contains moderate levels of security. Although it does exhibit
some weaknesses, the lack of evidence for authorisation bypass or remote access is promising. It
appears that the vulnerabilities discovered earlier in its lifecycle have been repaired, and have
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ultimately acted to increase the strength of the device as a whole. Additionally, the proper
sanitisationofvariablesbytheembeddedwebserverisconsideredeffective.
That said, those weaknesses identified can still be used to impact a user. To this end, several
recommendationsaremadetomitigateorpreventthesevulnerabilities.Firstly,thefirmwareonthe
device should be upgraded to the latest version. Although uptodate patching is important for all
securityproducts,thisisparticularlysalientfortheDCS930L,giventhesusceptibilitytobruteforce
attacksthatearlierfirmwarecontains.
Additionally,theadhocwirelessmodeshouldbeavoidedwhereverandwheneverpossible.Thisis
giventhelargeamountofinformationintheliteraturepointingtoweaknessintheWEPencryption
scheme.WPA2,whilstnotperfect,isconsideredtobesaferthanWEPforwirelesstransmissions.
Perhapsthestrongestthreatsagainstthecameracomefromaneavesdroppedonthelocalnetwork.
Therehasbeenevidencetosuggestamyriadofinstanceswherehighlysensitiveinformation(such
aspasswords)issentincleartextacrossthenetwork.Itappearsthatthecamerassecuritywillonly
beasstrongasthenetworkthatit’splacedupon.
ThereissomepossibilityfortheDCS930Ltobeusedasanentrypointontothenetwork.Assuming
authorisedaccesscanbegained,theplaintextinformationstoredonthecameramaygivefurther
access to the network. For example, the credentials for the FTP server are stored in the clear.
Threats such as these should be considered when assessing the application of an IP camera. In
practice,itwouldbewisetoisolatethisinformationtothecameraalone,assumingthatatonestage
itwillbeaccessedbymaliciousactors.
One area of the methodology that was perhaps at fault was the measurement of network traffic,
especially in relation to the SSL communication between the DLink website and the camera.
WiresharkitselfwasmonitoringfromthePCthatwasinteractingwiththedevice.Whilstthiswould
havebeeneffectiveatcapturingtrafficbetweenthetwo,itmayhavemissedtrafficgoingfromthe
device,directtoanyothersources(forexample,directlytotheDLinkwebsite).Infuture,itwould
beadvisedtosetthelisteningdeviceontherouterdirectly,toattempttocapturealltrafficfromthe
camera.
Insummary,theDCS930Lisnotwithoutsomevulnerabilities,butoverallissuitableforthemarket
itwasdesignedfor.Giventhecostofthedevice,thisisparticularlytrue.Ifthiscameraweretobe
placedinasecureenvironment,however,thethreatsoflocaleavesdroppersandbruteforcewould
have to be strongly considered. It also offers further evidence and reasoning for why uptodate
patchingofsoftwareandfirmwareissovitallyimportantinallsecurityapplications.
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